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1. Introduction 
Trope bundle theories of substance (e.g. Williams 1953, Campbell 1990, Simons 1994, Denkel 
1996, Maurin 2002, Giberman 2014) aspire to a construction of objects by means of tropes. 
According to these nominalist one- or two-category ontologies, tropes form the sole 
fundamental categories of entities.1 As nominalist category systems, these theories must avoid 
explicitly assuming – or implicitly smuggling in – real generality, such as property or relation 
universals. Tropes are particulars: the -e charge of a specific electron is just as particular as the 
particle whose charge it determines by being its proper part. However, although tropes 
                                                          
1 Some trope theorists (such as Maurin (2002) and Simons (2003)), introduce relational tropes 
as a category additional to property tropes. 
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themselves are determinate particular natures according to standard trope nominalism, they fall 
under determinables, such as electric charge, and determinates, such as -e charge. Prima facie, 
the tropes falling under a determinate are exactly similar and the tropes falling under a 
determinable resemble each other more or less closely. It is a central challenge for any trope 
bundle theory to give a nominalistically acceptable account of the falling of tropes under 
determinates and determinables. 
 In this article, we adopt what Campbell (1990, 24-26) calls a sparse theory of 
tropes. According to this kind of conception, all known tropes are discovered empirically. 
Moreover, the best examples of monadic tropes are determinate quantities falling under the 
fundamental physical determinables (such as electric charge, mass, colour charge, spin, etc.). 
The tropes of some quantity determine intrinsic exact similarities between basic particles and 
contribute to accounting for their division into natural kinds (such as electron or down quark). 
Determinate and determinable physical quantities also figure in the laws of nature (such as 
Coulomb’s law) spelling out the causal powers of objects. Here, the trope bundle theorist seems 
to face a formidable challenge: she is obliged to provide an account of the objective (language- 
and mind-independent) divisions among tropes into determinable and determinate kinds 
consistent with the nominalist claim that there are only particulars (tropes and the objects they 
constitute). 
This article aims to address the challenge directly; we spell out how tropes 
themselves, as determinate particular natures, give rise to their own division into instances of 
distinct determinate and determinable kinds. The notion of internal relation plays a central role 
in this explanation. We begin by formulating the distinction between basic and derived internal 
relations in Section 2. This distinction aims to be sensitive to the decisive differences between 
different kinds of internal relations, and – unlike the current standard conceptions of internal 
relations – it is capable of spelling out the conditions in which an internal relation holds in virtue 
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of the existence of its relata. In Section 3, we argue that quantity tropes are, as determinate 
particular natures, mutually related by the basic internal relations of proportion and order. 
Because tropes mutually connected by these internal relations constitute distinct 
non-overlapping groups, tropes are also instances of distinct determinables and determinates. 
In Section 4, we argue that the main earlier attempts at answering the challenge 
are unsuccessful. According to what we call the "standard view", exact similarity and inexact 
resemblance are primitive internal relations between tropes. Nevertheless, it remains unclear 
whether an advocate of the standard view can avoid assuming determinable universals. The 
other proposed ways of answering the challenge, while avoiding the assumption of universals, 
lead to serious difficulties, too. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and points to certain 
important issues left open by this discussion. 
 
2. Basic and derived internal relations 
The view argued for here assigns a central theoretical role to specific types of relations, namely 
the relations of proportion and order between tropes. It is crucial to our view that these relations 
are internal: they constitute no addition of being; in other words, they are not entities in addition 
to their relata. Since internal relations are not entities of any sort, their holding of their relata 
should be based entirely on these relata. For the present purposes, it is instructive to begin with 
two different conceptions of internal relations present in the recent literature.2 
According to the first conception, a relation is internal if and only if its holding is 
wholly grounded in the corresponding properties of its relata (Wieland & Betti 2008, 517). As 
                                                          
2 Ehring (2011, 179) employs Armstrong’s (1989a, 43-44) characterization of internal 
relations. Since Armstrong’s characterization can be considered a disjunction of [IR1] and 
[IR2] below, we will not discuss it here. 
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an illustration, and as an explanation of the idea of a “corresponding property”, one may take 
up some monadic properties of macroscopic objects, such as being 1 kg in mass or having a 
round shape. If object a has the property of being round and b has that same (or, exactly similar) 
property, a and b are related by having the shape as. Here, the relation of having the same shape 
as is wholly grounded in the corresponding property of having a round shape (or, corresponding 
tropes), a property (tropes) possessed by each relatum. Trope theorists and all advocates of 
property universals take (at least certain) properties as entities. By contrast, there is no such 
entity as the relation of having the same shape as in the world, but only the corresponding 
properties of a and of b.3 
 The first conception of internal relations presupposes that objects have their 
monadic natural properties contingently. Internal relatedness is not derivative from the essential 
or de re necessary properties of the relata because this conception rules out essential properties 
as additional entities.4 Moreover, the grounding of an internal relation by the properties of the 
related entities is cashed out in terms of necessitation: necessarily, if the related objects have 
certain monadic properties, then they are related by the corresponding internal relation. Since 
                                                          
3 Cf. Campbell (1990, 111-113), Vallicella (2002, 5), and Wieland & Betti (2008, 517) for 
similar examples. Campbell and Wieland & Betti do not restrict the corresponding properties 
to the monadic properties of the relata, but we do not discuss the other options in this article. 
4 Essential properties as further entities are ruled out, e.g. by Armstrong (1989b, 1997) and 
Campbell (1990). The advocates of the first conception seem to follow this lead. An advocate 
of the first conception can admit that entities have their formal features (such as particularity 
and individuality) necessarily, but they are not considered as further entities. 
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the related objects do not necessitate the holding of the internal relation, an internal relation is 
“wholly grounded” in the properties of the relata:5  
  
[IR1]: Objects a and b are internally related by relation R if and only if the holding 
of R is necessitated by the (monadic) properties of a and b, but the holding of R 
is not necessitated by the existence of a and b.6 
 
According to the second conception of internal relations, internal relations hold 
only in virtue of the nature of the related entities themselves, not in virtue of some entities 
distinct from their relata, such as monadic properties.  
Mulligan (1998, 344) subscribes to the second conception. One of his examples 
is the relation of greater than holding between two particular “happinesses” (happiness tropes), 
those of Mary and Erna, when Mary is happier than Erna. These particular happinesses 
“necessitate the obtaining of the greater than relation between them” (ibid. 344-5). Mulligan is 
explicit in denying internality in cases like our two round objects above. While the greater than 
relation between Mary’s and Erna’s happiness tropes is internal, the relation of happier than 
between Mary and Erna themselves is external. Campbell (1990, 37, 112) gives internal 
                                                          
5 Campbell’s (1990, 112) “founded external relations” provide a variant of the same 
conception of internal relations. Cf. also Maurin (2002, 90-91) and Wieland & Betti (2008).  
6 In both [IR1] and [IR2], the relata of internal relations are called “objects”. The relata of 
internal relations in [IR2] could be entities of any kind. By contrast, in [IR1], the reference to 
objects (in the sense of bearers of contingent properties) is indispensable. The account of such 
entities depends on the details of the specific trope bundle theory. 
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relations exactly the same modal characterization as Mulligan, the relations of exact and less 
than exact resemblance between tropes serving as his prime examples.7 
Thus, Campbell's and Mulligan’s conception is contrary to [IR1]: it is precisely 
the existence of the related objects that necessitates internal relatedness. This conception could 
be summarized as follows: 
 
[IR2]: Objects a and b are internally related by relation R if and only if the holding 
of R is necessitated by the existence of a and b. 
 
The original intention of the advocates of [IR2] is to cash out the grounding of an internal 
relation in terms of metaphysical necessitation. Nevertheless, if we lift the above-mentioned 
ban on metaphysically necessary properties, [IR2] classifies relation R as internal in at least 
two types of cases. First, internal relation R may hold in virtue of the essential or de re necessary 
properties of the relata (let us call these cases of type (i)). Second, internal relation R may hold 
in virtue of the existence of the relata simpliciter, not in virtue of their properties, even essential 
ones (let us call these cases of type (ii)). 
 Trope theorists need to introduce internal relations of type (ii). First, tropes stand 
in some basic formal ontological relations (e.g. distinctness, ontological dependencies, and 
mereological relations) in virtue of being the entities they are.8 Second, if we postulate tropes 
                                                          
7 Although giving internal relations a Moorean characterization ("internal relations are 
essential to the identity of their (both) relata") (Moore 1960), Campbell (1990, 112) considers 
this equivalent to the modal characterization. Cf. Maurin (2002, 87-89). 
8 Arguably, any ontological category system must introduce formal ontological relations to 
avoid infinite regresses (cf. Smith & Mulligan 1983; Simons 2003; Lowe 2006, Sec. 3). 
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or property universals, they are – at least prima facie – exactly or inexactly similar in virtue of 
being specific thin natures (Maurin 2002, 88-89; Simons 2003). However, it is not a reasonable 
move to rule out internal relations of type (i): a trope theorist may want to accept tropes 
necessary to objects. According to one such view, if an object exists, it has some of its tropes 
as its de re necessary proper parts.9 
Thus, there is a need to distinguish between internal relations that hold in virtue 
of the mere existence of their relata, on the one hand, and internal relations that hold in virtue 
of the existence of some entities distinct from their relata (such as their contingent or necessary 
properties), on the other. Prima facie, the tropes falling under the same determinable are in the 
internal relations of “similarity”, which hold because tropes are the particular natures they are. 
Nevertheless, clause [IR2] is insufficient to spell out the conditions that enable these internal 
relations to hold in virtue of the existence of their relata as contrasted with internal relations 
holding in virtue of the existence of some entities distinct from the relata. The above distinction 
between internal relations of type (i) and (ii) does not help us either because the distinction 
collapses in the case of single, unaccompanied tropes allowed for by Campbell (1990), for 
instance. All trope bundle theories aspire to analyse inherence (objects having tropes), e.g. by 
means of parthood, co-location, and/or existential dependencies. Campbell (1990) analyses 
inherence in terms of parthood and co-location: trope t is a property of i if an only if t is a part 
of i and t is co-located with i. In Campbell’s analysis of inherence, unaccompanied tropes inhere 
in themselves by being necessary properties of their own. 
In order to capture the conditions in which internal relations hold in virtue of the 
existence of their relata, we wish to introduce a distinction between two different kinds of 
                                                          
9 Cf. Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2010; Keinänen 2011, Sec. 4. 
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internal relation, basic and derived. Assume that relation R holds of entities a1, …, an.10 A 
definition of basic and derived internal relations (respectively, [BIR] and [DIR] below) can be 
framed in terms of a more basic concept, that of proto internal relation [PIR]: 
 
[PIR]: Necessarily, entities a1, …, an are related by proto internal relation R if 
and only if a1, …, an exist. 
[DIR]: Necessarily, entities a1, …, an are related by derived internal relation R if 
and only if the holding of R of a1, …, an is derivative from proto internal relations 
holding between entities some of which are distinct from a1, …, an. 
[BIR]: Necessarily, entities a1, …, an are related by basic internal relation R if 
and only if R is a proto internal relation and the holding of R of a1, …, an is not 
derivative from proto internal relations holding between entities some of which 
are distinct from a1, …, an. 
 
The two types of internal relation, basic and derived, are mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive. All basic internal relations are proto internal. Some derived internal relations may 
be proto internal, but some of them are not proto internal because they hold contingently. 
All internal relations in the sense of [IR2] are proto internal on the plausible 
assumption that the holding of an internal relation requires that its relata exist. Moreover, it can 
be immediately seen from the above definitions that no internal relation in the sense of [IR1] – 
                                                          
10 This assumption is made in order to make it explicit that in clause [PIR], we restrict to 
relations R holding of entities a1, …, an. An alternative definition of proto internal relations 
would be a clause like [IR2]: entities a1, …, an are related by proto internal relation R iff, 
necessarily, R holds of a1, …, an if and only if a1, …, an exist.  
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i.e. an internal relation grounded by the contingent properties of its relata – is proto internal or 
basic internal. Among proto internal relations, there is a finer distinction based on whether or 
not the holding of a relation is derivative from the holding of proto internal relations between 
entities some of which are distinct from the relata of the original relation. Proto internal relations 
of the latter sub-type – i.e. basic internal relations [BIR] – include most of the standard 
examples of internal relations, such as primitive formal ontological relations and internal 
relations holding due to the nature of property universals or tropes (cf. above). Basic internal 
relations obtain due to the existence of the relata themselves. In order for them to hold, there 
need not be any specific entities distinct from the relata (such as monadic properties of the 
relata). 
Proto internal relations of the former sub-type are derived internal relations: their 
holding is derivative from proto internal relations holding between entities some of which are 
distinct from the relata of the original relation. Salient examples of derived proto internal 
relations are those holding in virtue of the necessary or essential properties of the relata 
provided that necessary properties are entities distinct from the relata. For instance, two 
electrons have exactly the same charge because of having two exactly similar charge tropes as 
their necessary properties. Here, the holding of the internal relation of having the same charge 
as is derivative from the holding of exact similarity between the charge tropes and the holding 
of whatever proto internal relations accounting for the inherence of these charge tropes in 
electrons.11 
                                                          
11 In Section 3, we replace exact similarity with the relation of order as a primitive basic 
internal relation between tropes. Internal relations in the sense of [IR1] are derived internal 
relations, which can be shown by means of a similar example. For reasons of space, we will 
leave the discussion of these derived internal relations for another occasion. 
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In our account, the proto internal relations between objects holding due to 
self-inherence – having the same charge as between two free-floating Campbellian -e charge 
tropes, for instance – are classified as basic internal. This is, of course, as it should be: in 
Campbell’s theory, individual tropes are co-located parts of their own (limiting cases of 
inherence). The only relevant factor here for the holding of the internal relation is their exact 
similarity.  
We do not consider the notion of derivativeness at work in our definitions as a 
precise technical concept. In the present paper, we will not take up the challenge of spelling out 
the details of the relevant kind of derivativeness. The notion is purported to be somewhat loose 
and theory-neutral, awaiting a more detailed theoretical account. There are, however, two 
important constraints on any suitable conception of derivativeness: first, derivativeness is 
modally as strong as metaphysical necessitation – a set of basic internal relations necessitates 
the holding of a derived internal relation. Second, the notion of derivativeness must be 
hyperintensional. A merely intensional notion, whose fineness of grain only reaches the level 
of metaphysical necessity, would be incapable of distinguishing between two different kinds of 
cases: (1) those in which an internal relation holds in virtue of some entities that are necessarily 
co-existent with but distinct from the relata (such as their necessary proper parts); and (2) those 
in which an internal relation holds in virtue of the mere existence of the relata. In (1), we are 
dealing with a derived internal relation, whereas in (2), we have a basic internal relation. 
The distinction between basic and derived internal relations outlined in this 
section is capable of specifying the conditions in which an internal relation holds in virtue of 
the existence of its relata. Most importantly, the notion of basic internal relation also captures 
the sense in which the relations of proportion and order between tropes – the relations playing 
a main role in the following sections – are internal. 
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3. Tropes connected by the relations of proportion and order 
 
The main thesis of this section is that quantity tropes are arranged into natural kinds (i.e. groups 
of different kinds of tropes) because of being in two different types of necessary relation: the 
relations of proportion and the relation of order.12 Tropes are certain thin particular natures: 
particular determinate masses, electric charges, and spin quantum numbers, for instance. We 
will argue that the status of tropes as particular natures has two important consequences with 
regard to the relations of proportion and order. First, the relations of proportion and order are 
basic internal relations between tropes; given that certain tropes exist, they are arranged in the 
relations proportion and order. We need not introduce any additional entities, e.g. property kind 
universals. Second, these relations generate natural divisions among tropes and remain invariant 
irrespective of the conventional choice of the unit of any quantity. 
 Most of the basic monadic quantities come in natural units (are quantized) and 
have both positive and negative values. The best-known example is electric charge, which has 
both negative (-e, -e/3, -2e/3) and positive (e, e/3, 2e/3) basic units.13 Of the basic monadic 
quantities, only mass does not come in basic units and has only positive values. To illustrate 
our account, let us now consider electric charge tropes. The trope theorists adopting a sparse 
                                                          
12 Cf. Bigelow & Pargetter (1990, 55-62) for a similar suggestion to use the relations of 
proportion to spell out the relations between determinate quantities. However, Bigelow & 
Pargetter introduce proportions as second-degree relation universals, i.e. relations between 
relation universals. By contrast, proportions are considered here as basic internal relations 
between quantity tropes. 
13 These basic units include both the charges of leptons and their anti-particles as well as the 
charges of quarks and anti-quarks. 
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theory of tropes (cf. Sec. 1) postulate tropes to determine at least the electric charges of the 
fundamental particles.14 First, all tropes of electric charge are mutually related by some relation 
of positive or negative proportion, which can be expressed by rational numbers. Assume that t1 
is a -e charge trope and t2 is a -e/3 charge trope. The following statement holds true of tropes t1 
and t2: 
 
[1]: Trope t1 is in 3:1 proportion to trope t2. 
 
Moreover, assuming that t3 is an e/3 charge trope, the following statement holds true of tropes 
t1 and t3: 
 
[2]: Trope t1 is in -3:1 proportion to trope t3. 
 
Certain metaphysicians, most notably Yuri Balashov (1999), have argued that we need to 
introduce zero-value quantitative properties to provide the best metaphysical account of certain 
basic physical quantities, such as electric charge and spin. We must sharply distinguish between 
having a zero-value quantity (e.g. zero electric charge) and a mere absence of that quantity. 
Assuming that Balashov is right (a claim whose correctness we will not assess in this paper), 
trope theory needs to provide an account of the necessary relations in which a zero-value charge 
trope is involved. Let t4 be a zero-value charge trope. Let n be some rational number other than 
zero. The following statement holds: 
                                                          
14 According to some trope theorists (e.g. Simons 1994, 1998), only simple objects are trope 
bundles. By contrast, Keith Campbell (1990) postulates complex tropes, which are properties 
of complex objects. 
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[3]: Trope t4 is in 0:n proportion to trope t3. 
 
Let us call the relation of 0:n proportion zero proportion. Claim [3] requires explanation. Since 
the choice of unit for electric charge is conventional, the absolute quantitative value assigned 
to trope t3 does not matter in expressing the relation of zero proportion (or, for the matter, any 
proportion relation); all that matters is that the proportion remains fixed. Trope t4 and all other 
zero-charge tropes are connected by the asymmetric relation of zero proportion to all non-
zero-charge tropes. 
Second, all electric charge tropes are mutually connected by greater than or equal 
to, which we call the relation of order. This relation is a non-strict total order.15 For instance, 
the following statement about tropes t1 and t3 is true: 
 
[4]: Trope t3 is greater than or equal to trope t1. 
 
Here, what is determined by the nature of tropes is the unified direction of the relation of order. 
By contrast, whether we call this a “lesser than or equal to” or a “greater than or equal to” 
relation is up to the conventionally chosen unit of electric charge. 
There is an obvious connection between these two necessary relations. If the 
relation of order between two charge tropes holds only in one direction (like in the case of 
tropes t1 and t2, and t4 and t3), the tropes are related by some asymmetric relation of proportion 
(such as 3:1 proportion or zero proportion). By contrast, if the relation of order holds in both 
                                                          
15 In other words, all charge tropes are connected by a greater than or equal to relation; the 
relation is transitive and non-symmetric (neither asymmetric nor symmetric). 
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directions, the tropes are "exactly similar" or "equal". Two zero-charge tropes t4 and t5 are equal 
in this sense. For obvious reasons, the relation of proportion does not hold between zero-charge 
tropes (one cannot divide by zero). All mutually equal charge tropes that are not zero-charge 
tropes are connected by the relation of 1:1 proportion, like two -e charge tropes. 
It is now easy to choose some unit for electric charge. We can take any of the 
electric charges of the charge tropes mutually connected by 1:1 proportion and select it as the 
unit. A natural choice for the unit would be a charge of some of the basic particles (cf. above) 
such as positron charge, e.16 Which values of charge are negative and which positive is 
stipulated in connection to the choice of unit. By means of the conventionally chosen unit, we 
can specify quantitative distances (“inexact resemblances”) between electric charge tropes – 
that zero-charge trope t4 is 1e greater than -e charge trope t1, for instance. 
 The relations of proportion and order are basic internal relations between electric 
charge tropes. Consider, for instance, the relation of -3:1 proportion between tropes t1 and t3. 
First, -3:1 proportion is a proto internal relation: necessarily, t1 and t3 are in the relation of -3:1 
proportion if and only if t1 and t3 exist. Second, the obtaining of the relation of -3:1 proportion 
is not derivative from proto internal relations holding between entities some of which are 
distinct from t1 and t3. In order to reach this conclusion, it suffices to maintain that tropes t1 and 
t3 are simple particular natures (particular natures with no proper parts).
17 Moreover, given that 
                                                          
16 That we call this quantity "e" and "charge" is, of course, based on our conventions, which 
presuppose that tropes are in the required relations of proportion and order, cf. below. 
17 Thus, we adopt the standard conception of tropes as particular natures defended by 
Campbell (1990), Maurin (2002, 2005), and Simons (2003). Moreover, as any basic entities of 
a category system, such as property universals in a system postulating universals, tropes stand 
in different formal ontological relations, which are also basic internal relations, cf. Section 2. 
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t1 is a particular -e charge and t3 is a particular e/3 charge, they are connected by the relation of 
-3:1 proportion. We need not postulate any entities distinct from t1 and t3. For instance, the 
holding of this proportion relation is not derivative from the holding of instantiation between 
tropes t1 and t3 and the respective property universals. In other words, -3:1 proportion is not a 
derived proto internal relation between tropes t1 and t3.
18 Hence, -3:1 proportion is a basic 
internal relation between tropes t1 and t3. In a similar way, we can show that all other relations 
of proportion and order between charge tropes (e.g. those described by clauses [1], [3] – [4]) 
fulfil condition [BIR] and are basic internal relations. 
 The basic internal relations of proportion and order are determined by the nature 
of tropes. It is a direct consequence of the existence of electric charge tropes that they are in 
these internal relations. Therefore, the relations of proportion and the relation of order remain 
invariant irrespective of the conventionally chosen unit of electric charge. How the relation of 
order is expressed (as a “lesser than or equal to” or “greater than or equal to” relation) is 
dependent on the conventional choice of the unit. 
Electric charge tropes appear to bear proportion-like relations to quantity tropes 
falling under some other determinable (mass tropes, for instance). Nevertheless, these 
proportion-like relations are, unlike the internal relations of proportion and order, determined 
by the conventional choice of units (for mass and electric charge). The dependence of these 
proportion-like relations on the choice of units can be seen in the fact that they do not remain 
                                                          
18 This kind of derived internal relation would fulfil [PIR], [DIR], and [IR2], but not [BIR]. 
Ellis (2001) and Lowe (2006, 2012) adopt this type view by claiming that all tropes (or 
modes) instantiate the respective property universals (e.g. that of -e charge). Lowe (2012, 
412) is also explicit in maintaining that, necessarily, if modes and certain property universals 
exist, modes instantiate these property universals. 
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invariant in all changes of the units, for instance, in such changes where we leave the unit of 
mass constant but choose some other unit for electric charge. Similarly, the proportion-like 
relations charge tropes appear to bear to entities other than tropes, e.g. numbers, do not remain 
invariant. Since these proportion-like relations are not determined by the nature of tropes, but 
rather by the conventional choice of units, they are not basic internal relations. 
 All electric charge tropes are mutually connected by the relation of order. 
Moreover, all non-zero-charge tropes are mutually connected by some relation of proportion. 
Zero-charge tropes, if there are such entities, are all connected by the relation of zero proportion 
to all non-zero-charge tropes. By means of the relations of proportion and the relation of order, 
we can specify the falling of a trope under the highest determinable, namely electric charge. 
The best way to do this is to select some arbitrary non-zero-charge trope u as a paradigm (or 
sample). Trope t is a charge trope if and only if t bears the relation of order and some relation 
of proportion to trope u. With the help of these basic internal relations, we can account for the 
falling of trope t under a determinable without reference to the determinable, namely electric 
charge. The falling of tropes under a determinable is determined by their nature, and there is no 
need to assume determinables as separate entities (e.g. determinable universals). Similarly, we 
can also specify quantitative distances between all charge tropes without recourse to the 
determinable.19 
In order to specify the tropes falling under some specific determinate quantity – 
say, -e charge – we can proceed in a similar way. We can select any -e charge trope u as a 
paradigm. Trope t is a -e charge trope if and if t is greater than or equal to u and u is greater 
than or equal to t. In other words, the two tropes are equal in order. Which trope u is selected 
                                                          
19 We can give quantitative distances only relative to some conventionally chosen unit. But as 
we saw above, the unit can be given without reference to the determinable. 
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as a paradigm does not matter, since the internal relations of order are determined by the nature 
of the tropes. The paradigm only serves as a “sample” in picking up the right kind of tropes. 
 It is fairly easy to generalize the present approach to most of the other basic 
monadic physical quantities, such as spin and rest mass. In these cases, we can show in a similar 
way that the tropes falling under a determinable are mutually connected by the basic internal 
relations of proportion and the basic internal relation of order. A minor complication results 
from the fact that rest masses do not come in natural units and it seems to be consistent with 
physics that they have arbitrarily small values (Balashov 1999). Different rest masses are not 
multiples of a common (positive) unit, and we need real numbers to express the relations of 
proportion between rest mass tropes. 
 In the present approach, we can specify the highest determinable quantity D under 
which any given quantity trope t falls by means of the relations of proportion and the relation 
of order. Let u be the non-zero quantity trope selected as a paradigm among the D tropes. Trope 
t falls under highest quantitative determinable D if and only if t is in some relation of (positive, 
negative, or zero) proportion and in the relation of order to u. The quantity tropes falling under 
distinct highest determinables are not connected by any relation of proportion or by the relation 
of order. The different relations of proportion and the relation of order divide quantity tropes 
into distinct and mutually exclusive pluralities (equivalence classes).20 Therefore, every trope 
falls under exactly one highest determinable. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is important to emphasize the order of 
ontological priority in our account. First, we postulate individual tropes, which are particular 
natures (e.g. determinate electric charges). Second, these tropes stand in the basic internal 
                                                          
20 In saying this, trope theorists may remain uncommitted to entities other than just tropes 
connected by these basic internal relations. 
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relations of proportion and order. Third, because of being invariant and determined by the 
nature of tropes, the relations of proportion and order generate natural divisions among tropes. 
We need no recourse to the specific quantities (mass, electric charge, etc.) under which the 
tropes fall. We obviously talk about certain kinds of tropes (e.g. charge tropes), which reflects 
the way we get to know them. Nevertheless, from the ontic point of view, the division of tropes 
into determinate/determinable kinds is only a by-product of their existence and standing in the 
basic internal relations of proportion and order. 
Thus, there is a certain kind of uniformity among quantity tropes because any 
quantity trope bears the relations of proportion and order to some other quantity tropes. The 
relations of proportion and order provide us with a comprehensive account of the “similarities” 
between quantity tropes falling under a determinable. Nevertheless, the nature of monadic 
quantity tropes falling under given determinable D is by no means exhausted by the relations 
of proportion and order they generate. Rather, the nature of these tropes is closely connected to 
their ability to determine the causal powers of the particles that possess them. For instance, 
electric charge tropes determine the causal powers of a particle to attract or repel other charged 
particles by some determinate force.21 Tropes falling under distinct determinable quantities 
differ in the kinds of causal powers they determine. 
The present approach still leaves us with open questions. The most important of 
them is the general applicability of the approach to all monadic quantity tropes. It seems to 
                                                          
21 It might be attractive to consider these determination relations as metaphysically necessary, 
for instance, that charge tropes in certain relative locations necessarily generate certain kinds 
of attractive or repulsive forces between objects. One variant of such a view would be a 
dispositionalist conception of tropes (cf. Whittle 2008). However, the details of such a view 
need to be worked out. 
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work well in the case of such monadic physical quantities as masses, electric charges, and spin 
quantum numbers.22 Moreover, we remain optimistic about the possibility of generalizing the 
approach to relational tropes (e.g. the tropes of space-time intervals if there are such entities).23 
Nevertheless, quark colour charges seem to form a unified system of two or three 
complementary charges. If there are such entities as monadic tropes of colour charge, we need 
to give a more detailed account of the necessary relations between them.24 Despite these open 
issues, the present approach is superior to its main alternatives, as we will argue in the next 
section. 
 
4. The superiority of the present approach 
 
The gist of the present approach is that the relations of proportion and order are determined by 
quantitative property tropes. Given that tropes exist as particular natures, they are internally 
related in certain ways by the basic internal relations of proportion and order. We need the 
relations of proportion and order in characterizing the “similarities” between quantity tropes 
and their belonging to determinate/determinable kinds. We need no additional internal relations. 
Nevertheless, the tropes falling under the additional empirically discovered determinables (such 
as colour charge(s)) may require a more elaborate account in the characterization of their being 
tropes belonging to a determinable kind. 
                                                          
22 Cf. Balashov (1999) and Morganti (2009) for useful discussions of the basic monadic 
physical quantities. 
23 Cf. Maurin (2002, ch.6; 2011) and Wieland & Betti (2008) for an interesting recent account 
of relational tropes as relata-specific relations. 
24 Cf. Maudlin (2007, 86ff.) for a discussion of colour charge. 
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In the account of “similarities” between tropes, the present approach does not rely 
on the primitive internal relations of exact similarity or inexact resemblance (quantitative 
distance). According to the currently standard approach to trope similarity (Campbell 1990; 
Maurin 2002; Simons 2003), the tropes falling under a determinate (e.g. 1 kg tropes) are 
mutually connected by the relation of exact similarity. According to this approach, exact 
similarity is a primitive basic internal relation between tropes: given that two distinct 1 kg tropes 
t and u exist, they are exactly similar. It is a natural expansion of this view to consider the tropes 
falling under a determinable inexactly similar. Inexact similarities between quantity tropes 
allow for a more precise expression in terms of quantitative distances: for instance, 3 kg trope 
v is 1 kg greater than 2 kg trope w. The relations of quantitative distance and exact similarity 
generate a non-strict total order ("equal to or greater than") among the tropes falling under a 
determinable (e.g. mass tropes). 
Our worry with this account concerns quantitative distances. Consider, again, 3 
kg trope v and 2 kg trope w. We must give the quantitative distance between v and w by recourse 
to the unit of mass: 3 kg trope v is 1kg greater than 2 kg trope w. The reference to the unit 
contains an implicit reference to the determinable (mass): trope v is by certain unit of mass U 
greater than trope w. The advocate of the (extended) standard approach takes this quantitative 
distance as primitive and not to be accounted for by means of any other internal relation between 
v and w. Therefore, she seems to be unable to show that tropes are in relation of quantitative 
distance without themselves being instances of determinable universals (determinable kinds of 
tropes).25 
                                                          
25 In the present case, one may, e.g. consider quantitative distance a derived internal relation 
between tropes v and w; it holds because v and w instantiate the respective determinate kind 
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 Hence, it is a general problem for the standard approach that inexact similarities 
considered as quantitative distances are not good candidates for (primitive) basic internal 
relations. A precise characterization of these internal relations requires recourse to the 
determinable with respect to which tropes are inexactly similar. One is inclined to consider 
tropes connected by these relations as instances of a determinable property. This is in a stark 
contrast with the conception presented in the previous section, in which “exact similarities” and 
"inexact resemblances" between quantity tropes are laid down without recourse to any 
determinable. There is no threat of circularity here because the relations of proportion and order 
uniquely specify the determinate/determinable quantity under which given tropes fall. 
 There are two more approaches to inexact resemblances between quantity tropes 
that merit a brief consideration. Both of them can be developed independently of one’s account 
of “exact resemblances”. In order to avoid the primitive internal relation of exact resemblance, 
we may assume that exact resemblances are accounted for by means of the relation of order in 
a way envisaged in the previous section. 
First, Keith Campbell (1990, Secs. 4.3-4.4) considers the quantity tropes falling 
under a determinable (e.g. mass tropes) as complex tropes, conjunctive compresences formed 
by the tropes of the smaller units of the same quantity. The basic idea behind this is very simple: 
two distinct, mutually co-located quantity tropes falling under the same determinable, two mass 
tropes t and u, for instance, form a complex trope whose quantitative value amounts to the sum 
of the values of t and u. If t is a 1 kg trope and u is a 2 kg trope that are mutually co-located, 
they form 3 kg trope v. More generally, every aggregate of mutually co-located (compresent) 
                                                          
universals and the kind universals are internally related. Cf. Ellis (2001) for a more detailed 
view of tropes as instances of determinate and determinable kind universals. 
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mass tropes constitutes a complex trope, a conjunctive compresence, whose quantitative value 
amounts to the value of the sum of the constituent tropes. 
Campbell takes tropes to be independent existents, which can exist without being 
accompanied by other tropes.26 Consequently, tropes falling under a determinable can form 
conjunctive compresences independently of the existence of the tropes falling under any distinct 
determinables. The theory allows for some quantity tropes (such as electric charge tropes) to be 
constituted by tropes of some single basic unit (e/3 charge). Hence, it can accommodate the fact 
many quantities come in natural units. In the context of Campbell’s trope theory, we can form 
a general account of complex tropes in terms of conjunctive compresences.27 
Despite its impressive merits, Campbell’s theory has (at least) two serious 
problems. First, as noted in the previous section, rest masses do not come in natural units but 
get arbitrarily small values. Moreover, we may well need irrational numbers to present the 
proportions between distinct rest masses. It seems that we cannot present “larger masses” as 
multiples of some common smaller unit mass (however small). Therefore, it seems that we 
cannot reduce all rest mass tropes to conjunctive compresences of rest mass tropes of some 
common smaller unit. The second problem with Campbell’s theory is that it does not give any 
                                                          
26 To be more precise, according to Campbell (1990), every trope t exists independently of 
any other trope that is not a proper part of t. The only exceptions of this rule are positions of 
space-time, which he claims to be separate "quasi-tropes" or "place tropes": every trope t must 
be accompanied by some (although not any specific) place trope. 
27 As a generalization of his conception of conjunctive compresences, Campbell allows for the 
distinct maximal aggregates of co-located tropes falling under a determinable in different 
locations to form conjunctive compresences, whose value amounts to the sum of the values of 
all of their constituent tropes. 
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account of the inexact resemblances between the tropes of negative and positive units of some 
quantity (e.g. the tropes of negative and positive charge).28 Because of these two serious 
problems, Campbell's account is not a credible competitor of our approach, analysing inexact 
similarities in terms of the relations of proportion and order. 
One can construe another possible approach to inexact resemblances in terms of 
the necessary relation of order (greater than or equal to) and a primitive three-place summation 
relation.29 The latter is supposed to provide quantitative distances between the tropes falling 
under a determinable. For instance, every 1 kg trope t and 2 kg trope u bears the summation 
relation to any 3kg trope w. A trope whose quantitative value amounts to a sum of lesser values 
of the quantity need not be considered complex. (This is a major difference between this 
approach and Campbell's theory.) Rather, the latter bears the primitive summation relation to 
the tropes having the lesser values. Therefore, we seem to be able to account for the "inexact 
similarities" between the fundamental tropes of the negative and positive values of the same 
quantity (the tropes of negative and positive charge, for instance). Moreover, in giving 
quantitative distances by means of the summation relation, the approach clearly avoids the 
postulation of determinable universals. 
The main problem of this approach concerns the general assumptions it makes 
about the existence of different kinds of tropes: assume that w is an arbitrary trope greater than 
                                                          
28 However, the advocate of conjunctive compresences may consider the restrictions to the 
composition of tropes in her theory as brutal. Therefore, she can avoid all reference to 
determinables in her account of complex tropes. 
29 A similar approach to inexact resemblances between quantitative properties is advocated by 
Maya Eddon (2013), who follows Mundy (1987). However, she considers quantities as 
universals and order and summation as second-order relation universals.  
24 
 
trope t. Given that these two tropes t and w exist, there must exist some third trope u that fulfils 
the following condition: t and u bear the three-place summation relation to trope w. The 
quantitative value of w amounts to the sum of the values of t and u. However, if tropes are 
discovered a posteriori as properties of objects, there can be no guarantee that such trope u 
should exist. Rather, this approach is simply committed to an a priori assumption that some 
such trope u exists.30 By contrast, if we present "inexact similarities" by means of the relations 
of proportion and order, we need not commit ourselves a priori to the existence of such extra 
tropes. Hence, although the latest approach has certain interesting features, it is not a serious 
rival to our approach. 
Our account presented in the previous section provides the best currently available 
conception of "similarities" between quantity tropes. With the help of basic internal relations 
of proportion and order, we obtain an accurate conception of similarities and eliminate any 
reference to determinables. Hence, we explicitly eliminate any need for assuming determinable 
universals. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have defended a new conception of internal relations between quantity tropes 
belonging to determinate and determinable kinds acceptable to the advocates of different trope 
bundle theories. The core idea behind our conception is that individual tropes are, as determinate 
particular natures, internally related by certain relations of proportion and order. By being 
determined by the nature of tropes, the relations of proportion and order give rise to natural 
                                                          
30 In constructing her original approach, Eddon (2013) assumes that monadic properties are 
Platonic universals, which need not be instantiated in order to exist. 
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divisions among tropes, and divide them into tropes belonging to distinct determinable and 
determinate kinds. 
In Section 2, we presented a novel distinction between different kinds of internal 
relations with two important new features. First, unlike the standard distinction, our new 
distinction does not rely on inherence (objects having properties). Instead, we distinguish 
between basic and derived internal relations. Basic internal relations constitute a sub-group of 
proto internal relations, internal relations holding necessarily if their relata exist. The holding 
of a basic internal relation is not derivative from the holding of additional internal relations 
connecting entities some of which are distinct from the relata of the original relation. Thus, 
second, being necessitated by the existence of the related entities is not sufficient for a relation 
to be a basic internal relation. We also demand that the holding of the relation does not depend 
(even indirectly) on the existence of any specific entities distinct from its original relata. 
Being equipped with this improved account of internal relations, we argued in 
Section 3 that quantity tropes falling under determinable D are mutually connected by the basic 
internal relations of proportion and order. Since these basic internal relations hold in virtue of 
the nature of the related tropes, we can select any non-zero-value D trope u as a sample 
(paradigm); trope t is a D trope if and only if t is connected by the relation of order and some 
relation of proportion to trope u. In this way, we can specify the determinable under which 
given trope t falls by means of the nature of tropes under consideration without recourse to the 
determinable. In a similar way, we can specify the determinate kind to which a given trope 
belongs. 
In Section 4, we argued that our account is superior to its main recent rivals. The 
"standard conception" takes exact similarity and inexact resemblances (quantitative distances) 
as primitive internal relations. The advocates of the standard conception are obliged to give an 
accurate account of these primitives. It seems that any attempt to present them as primitive 
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internal relations involves reference to a determinable. Therefore, it may be difficult to avoid 
commitment to determinable universals. The two additional proposals presented in Section 4 
do not presuppose the existence of universals. Nevertheless, neither of them turned out to be a 
serious alternative to our approach: whereas Campbell's proposal is inadequate, the use of the 
primitive summation relation makes us involved in the existence assumptions entirely 
unmotivated by the sparse nominalist perspective. 
Since we subscribe to the empirically motivated sparse theory of tropes, we 
remain open to the discovery of tropes belonging to new determinable kinds. Moreover, our 
approach may need to be developed further to be applicable to quantity tropes belonging to such 
new kinds. We already mentioned a comparatively recently discovered determinable kind(s), 
namely, quark colour charges, in Section 3. It also falls out of the scope of the present article to 
defend a trope nominalist theory of determinable and determinate kinds, but our theory is 
compatible with different alternatives (e.g. considering determinables/determinates as sets of 
tropes or denying their existence altogether). We must also leave answering the specific 
arguments presented for the existence of determinate or determinable universals (e.g. referring 
to the alleged need for universals as truthmakers of laws of nature) for another occasion. 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
We wish to thank Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Tuomas Tahko for helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this paper. Moreover, we thank Finnish Cultural Foundation for funding this 
research. 
 
 
 
27 
 
References 
  
Armstrong, D.M. (1989a): Universals - an Opinionated Introduction, (Boulder: Westview 
Press). 
Armstrong, D. M: (1989b): A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Armstrong, D.M. (1997): A World of States of Affairs, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
Balashov, Y. (1999): “Zero-Value Physical Quantities”, Synthese 119, 253-286. 
Bigelow, J. & Pargetter, R. (1990): Science and Necessity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
Campbell, K. K. (1981): “The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars”, Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 6, 477-488. 
Campbell, K. K. (1990): Abstract Particulars, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
Denkel, A. (1996): Object and Property, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Eddon, M. (2013): "Fundamental Properties of Fundamental Properties", in K. Bennett & D. 
Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford, 78-104.  
Ehring, D. (2011): Tropes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Ellis, B. (2001): Scientific Essentialism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Giberman, D. (2014): “Tropes in Space”, Philosophical Studies 167 (2), 453-472. 
Keinänen, M. (2011). Tropes – The Basic Constituents of Powerful Particulars. Dialectica 
65(3), 419-450 
Keinänen, M. & Hakkarainen, J. (2010). Persistence of Simple Substances. Metaphysica, 11(2), 
119-135 
Lowe, E.J. (2006): The Four-Category Ontology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
28 
 
Lowe, E.J. (2012): “A Neo-Aristotelian Substance Ontology – Neither Relational nor 
Consistuent”, In Tuomas E. Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 229-248. 
Maudlin, T. (2007): Metaphysics within Physics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Maurin, A-S. (2002): If Tropes, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers). 
Maurin, A-S. (2005): “Same but Different”, Metaphysica 6(1), 131-146. 
Maurin, A-S. (2011): An Argument for the Existence of Tropes, Erkenntnis 74 (1), 69-79. 
Moore, G. E. (1960 [1922]): “External and Internal Relations,” in Moore, G.E: Philosophical 
Studies, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 276–309. 
Morganti, M. (2009): “Tropes and Physics”, Grazer Philosophische Studien 78, 185-205. 
Mulligan, K. (1998): “Relations Through Thick and Thin”, Erkenntnis 48 (2 & 3), 325-353. 
Mundy, B. (1987): "The Metaphysics of Quantity", Philosophical Studies 51, 1, 29-54.  
Simons, P.M (1994): “Particulars in Particular Clothing – Three Trope Theories of Substance”, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 3, 553-575. 
Simons, P.M. (1998): “Farewell to Substance - a Differentiated Leave-Taking”, Ratio XI, 235-
251. 
Simons, P.M. (2003): “Tropes, Relational”, Conceptus 35, 53-73. 
Smith, B & Mulligan, K. (1983): “Framework for Formal Ontology”, Topoi 2, 73-85. 
Vallicella, V. (2002): “Realism, Monism, and the Vindication of Bradley’s Regress, Dialectica 
56, 1, 3-35. 
Whittle, A. (2008): "A Functionalist Theory of Properties", Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 77: 1, 59-82. 
Wieland, J. W. & Betti, A. (2008): “Relata-specific Relations: A Response to Vallicella”, 
Dialectica 62 (4), 509-524. 
Williams, D. C. (1953): “On the Elements of Being I”, Review of Metaphysics 7, 3-18. 
